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ARGUMENT
As the trial court stated in denying Stewart's first motion for summary
judgment, the Pharmacist in this case wants the best of both worlds: "He wants the
economic profit from making a desirable product available for sale but wants to avoid the
testing, research and warning responsibility that generally attach to the introduction of a
new product." (Record at 1004.) Stewart's created a product not otherwise available to
fill what he perceived to be a need in the marketplace, and marketed that product by
providing free samples for physicians to try out on their patients. Based on this activity,
the trial court correctly found that he stepped from behind the pharmacist's counter and
became a pharmaceutical manufacturer by creating and marketing a product not
otherwise available. (Id.) Nonetheless, Stewart's maintains that it is subject to none of
the legal duties that go with being a pharmaceutical manufacturer, and argues that it
should be allowed to take advantage of protections generally afforded to pharmacists.
Stewart's cannot have it both ways.
All of Stewart's arguments, both in its Cross-Appeal and in its Response to
Schaerrer's Appeal, are based upon two erroneous assertions. First, Stewart's
mischaracterizes its role in supplying its product (the combination fen-phen capsule) to
Schaerrer. Stewart's arguments are based upon the position that it was merely a passive
retailer, an unsuspecting link in the chain of distribution. The evidence is
overwhelmingly to the contrary. Second, Stewart's maintains that, in order to prevail on
her strict liability claims, Schaerrer is required to prove that some conduct of Stewart's
caused her injuries. This is wholly inconsistent with well-settled strict products liability
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jurisprudence.
CROSS APPEAL
POINT I.

STEWART'S IS NOT IMMUNE FROM PLAINTIFF'S STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS
The issue presented by Stewart's cross-appeal is whether the trial court

correctly determined that Stewart's was not entitled to immunity from claims of strict
products liability. Stewart's cites several non-Utah decisions holding that pharmacists
are immune from strict products liability for injuries caused by defects in drug products
they provide to patients. However, apparently recognizing that the circumstances of this
case are factually distinct from those in which other courts have granted pharmacist
immunity from strict liability, Stewart's urges this Court to adopt a modified version of
pharmacist immunity to fit these circumstances. The rule urged by Stewart's is
unworkable and is inconsistent with the concepts underlying strict products liability.
A.

The Authorities Cited By Stewart's In Support Of Pharmacist
Immunity Are Inapplicable To This Case.
No Utah court has yet adopted the position advocated by Stewart's, i.e. that

pharmacists are immune from strict liability for injuries caused by defective drugs.
Stewart's cites several decisions from other jurisdictions in urging that this Court adopt
such a doctrine. However, all of those decisions involved circumstances which are quite
different from this case and which do not support an extension of that doctrine to this
case.
Each of the cases cited by Stewart's arose from similar factual
circumstances. Those cases are unlike the instant case, however, as those cases involved
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pharmaceutical products manufactured, marketed and sold by large drug companies
subject to FDA regulations. These finished drug products were supplied to pharmacies,
which then dispensed them to plaintiffs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. See Coyle v.
Bonnet Lane Pharmacy, 584 A.2d 1383 (Pa. 1991) (case involving prescription drug
Bendectin, manufactured by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals); Raynor v.
Richardson-Merrell Inc.. 643 F.Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1986) (also involving Bendectin);
Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 710 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1985) (case involving
prescription drug DES, manufactured by E.R. Squibb & Sons); and Leeslev v. West 518
N.E. 2d 758 (111. App. 1988) (case involving drug Feldene, manufactured by Pfizer, Inc.).
In Coyle, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pointed out that,
unlike the marketing system for most other products, the
distribution system for prescription drugs is highly restricted.
Pharmacists, as suppliers, do not freely choose which
'products' they will make available to consumers in any given
instance, and patients, as consumers, do not freely choose
which 'product' to buy. Physicians exercising sound medical
judgment act as intermediaries in the chain of distribution ...
IdLatl386.
Coyle, and the other cases cited by Stewart's, illustrate the body of law
which has developed to define the responsibilities of the participants in this "highly
restricted distribution system" for prescription drugs. Specifically, these cases govern the
duties of: (a) pharmaceutical manufacturers which formulate and test drug products, seek
approval from the FDA to market the drug, and prepare warnings, which are also subject
to FDA approval, regarding the risks and side effects of their products; (b) physicians
who, based upon their evaluations of their patients and information supplied by drug
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manufacturers, determine what medications are appropriate for their patients; and
(c) pharmacists who receive a prescription from a doctor and simply dispense the drug in
the prescribed dosage and quantity to a patient. Legal concepts including limitations on
strict products liability for manufacturers of drugs , the learned intermediary doctrine ,
and pharmacist immunity3 have developed in this highly restricted distribution system for
prescription drugs. These concepts arose from cases such as Coyle, Raynor, etc., in
which a pharmaceutical manufacturer goes through the FDA approval process and brings
a drug to market, provides information regarding the uses and risks of the drug to
prescribing doctors, who can then assess the risks and benefits for a particular patient,
and where the pharmacist's role is limited to merely dispensing the correct drug in the
dosage and quantity specified by the physician's prescription.
The difference between the circumstances presented by this case and those
in the authorities cited by Stewart's is clear. As the trial court correctly held in its
September 1,2000 Order denying summary judgment, Stewart's activities in this case
deprived him of the pharmacist immunity which might otherwise attach. (See Record at
1

In Grundberg v. The Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991), this Court adopted
comment k to Section 402 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This ruling, which
limited strict liability claims against pharmaceutical manufacturers, relied heavily on the
"elaborate regulatory system" overseen by the FDA as supporting adoption of comment k
with respect to manufacturers of prescription drugs. 813 P.2d at 95-97.
"The fact that manufacturers of a prescription drug cannot adequately evaluate the
effect of the drug on any particular patient is one of the predominant reasons that courts
have adopted the learned intermediary doctrine exempting those manufacturers from the
duty to directly warn consumers, [citations omitted]" Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758,
762 (111.App. 1988).
Coyle, supra at 1386.
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1003-1008.) Stewart's activities with respect to the development, formulation, marketing
and sale of one-a-day fen/phen took him outside of the highly restricted system of
prescription drug distribution on which pharmacy immunity is based. The record is clear
with respect to the following:
•

Stewart Koeven came up with the idea for one-a-day, combination
fenfluramine-phentermine capsules, in an effort to address what he
saw was a lack of compliance by patients taking these medications.
(Record at 680, 687-93.)

•

Stewart Koeven created a new product which was not otherwise
available and which did not go through the normal FDA-reviewed
process of clinical trials to establish safety and efficacy. (Record at
1004,824-851.)

•

Stewart Koeven performed no testing as to the safety or efficacy of
his product, and as far as he knew, no one had ever prepared or
tested such a product at the time he was developing it. (Record at
680, 687-92; see also Record at 846-51.) Stewart's also failed to
provide any warnings regarding potential risks or side effects to the
physicians to whom it marketed its products, including Schaerrer's
prescribing physician Dr. Jeffrey Johnson. (Record at 848-50, 85343, 1007.)

•

Stewart Koeven created a market for his new product by supplying
samples of his drug product to doctors to try out on their patients,
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prior to ever receiving a single prescription for the combination fenphen capsule. (Id.; see also Record at 1007.)
•

With respect to the prescriptions filled for Schaerrer, Stewart's did
more than simply "fill a valid prescription." Dr. Johnson initially
prescribed to Schaerrer 60 mg of fenfluramine and 20 mg of
phentermine. (See, e.g., Record at 617.) Stewart's provided a single
capsule with the fenfluramine, phentermine, plus a purported time
release agent and a filler, which were not specified in Dr. Johnson's
prescription. (Id.; see also Record at 1007.)4

Given these facts, this Court should reject Stewart's contention that its role
was no different than any other pharmacist filling a prescription. Stewart's activities do
not support application of the policies supporting pharmacy immunity, as discussed in
Coyle. For example, Stewart's acted like a pharmaceutical manufacturer in that he
perceived a need for a specific product in the marketplace {i.e., a one-a-day capsule to
address the "compliance" problem), and he developed and marketed that product. Unlike
the situation in Coyle, Stewart's did freely choose which products it would make
available to consumers. In addition, Dr. Johnson did not act as a learned intermediary in
the chain of distribution, as Stewart's failed to make any information about his product
available to Dr. Johnson. Finally, the Coyle court pointed out that imposing strict

4

The uncontroverted testimony of Schaerrer's expert, Dr. Bruce Woolley, is that this fact
alone took Stewart's outside the realm of a compounding pharmacist. Stewart's activities
were instead the activities of a pharmaceutical manufacturer conducting a clinical trial of
an experimental drug. (Record at 824-30.)
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liability on pharmacists would not serve the purpose of preventing the circulation of
defective products. Coyle, 584 A.2d at 1386. Here, subjecting Stewart's to strict liability
would have the beneficial effect of dissuading pharmacists from concocting new drug
products outside the purview of the FDA's regulatory system.
B.

Stewart's Proposed Rule Is Unworkable And Inconsistent With Strict
Products Liability,
Apparently realizing that it is not entitled to pharmacy immunity under the

facts of this case, Stewart's urges the Court to adopt a new rule of law whereby a
pharmacist engaging in "some manufacturing activity" is not subject to strict liability if
the "manufacturing activities are tangential," do not increase the risk of using the drug
and the drugs are supplied pursuant to a valid prescription by a doctor. (See Stewart's
Brief at 18.) Putting aside the difficulties in determining from case to case whether a
particular pharmacist's activities are "tangential," Stewart's proposed rule is simply
incompatible with concepts of strict products liability.
The doctrine of strict products liability focuses on the nature of the product
at issue, not the conduct of the defendants. To establish strict products liability under
Utah law, a plaintiff need only prove that (1) the product is unreasonably dangerous due
to a defect or a defective condition; (2) the defect existed at the time the product was
sold; and (3) the defective condition was a cause of the plaintiffs injury. Lamb v. B&B
Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 929 (Utah 1993). The conduct of a manufacturer in
creating the defect, and whether or not the manufacturer used due care in producing the
product, are irrelevant to the strict products liability analysis. As this Court has made
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clear, strict liability attaches even if "the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product." See Grundberg, supra, 602 P.2d at 156, adopting
§ 402 A of Restatement (Second) of Torts. The analysis of whether a seller of a product is
subject to strict products liability does not turn on whether the seller's activities are
tangential or central to creation of the defect in the product. The focus is instead on the
product itself and whether that product is defective, i.e., it is unreasonably dangerous to
the user. Unreasonably dangerous means that the product was dangerous to an extent
beyond that which was would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer when
considering the product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses together
with any actual knowledge, training or experienced possessed by that particular user.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 (2) (1996). Stewart's proposed "rule" would require an
analysis of the pharmacist's conduct in causing or contributing to the defect. Such an
analysis is at odds with the strict products liability doctrine, and should be rejected.5
REPLY RE SCHAERRER'S APPEAL
POINT I.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT DISPOSITIVE
Stewart's points out that Schaerrer has not challenged the trial court's

findings of fact. However, the findings are not dispositive of the issues presented here
and do not compel the result sought by Stewart's. In addition, Schaerrer does take issue

5

Stewart's would not qualify for pharmacist immunity under the rule it proposes in any
event. Stewart's suggests that this Court limit pharmacy immunity to cases in which "the
drugs are supplied pursuant to a valid prescription by physician." As argued above,
Stewart's went beyond the face of the prescription written by Dr. Johnson for Schaerrer;
Stewart's combination fen-phen product contained ingredients not specified in
Dr. Johnson's written prescription. (See footnote 4, above, and accompanying text.)
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with Stewart's characterization of one of the court's findings of fact: Stewart's maintains
that "the court found that Stewart's so-called 'manufacturing' activities did not cause
Schaerrer's injuries and Schaerrer conceded this point." (Stewart's Brief at 9.) The court
did not make this finding and Schaerrer has not conceded this point. What the court
actually found was that there was no evidence supporting an inference that the combining
of fenfluramine, phentermine and a time-released agent in a single capsule altered or
affected the fenfluramine or that the fenfluramine supplied by Stewart's was more
dangerous or more likely to cause injury to plaintiff than fenfluramine supplied to
plaintiff by defendant American Home Products. (See Record at 1159; see also
Appellee's Index, Tab 2.) As argued herein, Schaerrer is not required to prove that
Stewart's "activities" caused her injuries.
POINT IL

STEWART'S HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT IT IS ENTITLED
TO INDEMNIFICATION FROM PCCA
Stewart's argues that it is entitled to indemnification from PCCA as a

matter of law. (Stewart's Brief at 10-12). Stewart's argument is based upon two
fallacies: First, Stewart's maintains that the only basis on which it may be strictly liable
is as a mere link in the chain of distribution of fenfluramine. (Id.) Second, Stewart's
argues that Schaerrer is required to submit evidence that some conduct of Stewart's
caused Schaerrer's injuries.
A.

Stewart's Is More Than A Passive Link In The Distribution Chain.
As argued at length in Schaerrer's opening brief, Stewart's role in

providing diet drugs to Schaerrer went far beyond simply passing along a product

-9-

manufactured by somebody else. The product that injured Schaerrer (Stewart's
combination fen-phen capsule) did not even exist until Stewart's came up with the idea of
combining fenfluramine and phentermine in a single capsule with a purported time
release agent, marketing it through word of mouth by supplying free samples to doctors
to try out on their patients and making it available to patients who requested that their
doctors prescribe its product to them.6 These activities distinguish Stewart's from a mere
passive retailer, and make him the manufacturer of the product which caused injury to
Schaerrer. This point has been conceded by Stewart's and adopted by the trial court.
(See Record at 1007.) Having conceded that it is a manufacturer, Stewart's is forced to
argue that the specific activities which made it a manufacturer did not cause Schaerrer's
injuries. However, in order to prevail on her strict liability claims, Schaerrer is not
required to prove that she was injured by this conduct. She can prevail on her strict
liability claims by proving that a defect in Stewart's product caused her injury.
B.

Evidence That Stewart's Conduct Caused Schaerrer's Injuries Is Not
An Element of the Strict Products Liability Claim,
The sufficiency of Schaerrer's evidence that Stewart's combination

fen-phen capsule caused or contributed to her valvular heart disease is not at issue in
these appeals. (See, e.g., Statement of Issues Presented For Review, Stewart's Brief at
2.) However, there is ample expert testimony in this case, not all of which is before the

6

Stewart's will likely argue that the "product" at issue is the raw fenfluramine powder
which he obtained from PCCA to incorporate into his combination capsule. However,
Schaerrer did not simply ingest raw fenfluramine powder passed on to her by Stewart's.
She purchased and ingested combination fen-phen capsules created, manufactured,
marketed and sold by Stewart's.
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Court, from which a jury could find that the product supplied to Schaerrer by Stewart's,
the combination fen-phen capsule, was unreasonably dangerous and defective and caused
or contributed to Schaerrer's heart valve injury. As argued above at pages 7-8, the
relevant analysis is whether the defective condition of the product caused Schaerrer's
injury, not whether Stewart's conduct caused the injury.
C.

Comparative Fault Principles Apply to Strict Products Liability
Claims,
Stewart's also makes the argument, echoing the trial court's statements at

the hearing on the underlying summary judgment motion, that the trier of fact would be
unable to apportion fault among several defendants in this strict liability action.
(Stewart's Brief at 15.) As argued in Schaerrer's opening brief, this is simply wrong.
(See Brief of Appellant, at 18-20.) The Utah Liability Reform Act expressly applies to
strict liability claims, including strict products liability. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (2).
This Court has previously held that comparative fault principles apply in strict products
liability actions. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981). Strict
liability is a method of determining who is liable for a particular injury; it is not a method
of allocating damages among various tortfeasors.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff and appellant Jeanne Schaerrer
respectfully requests that this Court (1) reverse the trial court's April 30, 2001 Order and
Judgment granting Stewart's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Schaerrer's
complaint against Stewart's; (2) affirm the trial court's September 1, 2000 Order denying
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summary judgment; and (3) remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings,
including trial.
Dated: June 11,2002
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